The African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson elections on February 15, 2025, marked another setback for Kenya’s regional ambitions as former Prime Minister Raila Odinga fell short against Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf. Despite a strong initial showing, Odinga’s campaign crumbled due to shifting allegiances, linguistic blocs, and Kenya’s diplomatic miscalculations. This election serves as a stark reminder that successful African diplomacy requires more than just confidence. It demands strategic coalition-building and an appreciation of the continent’s deep-seated geopolitical realities.
Raila Odinga’s bid faltered due to four major factors: religion, France’s influence, regional politics, and President William Ruto’s handling of crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Israel. Each of these played a role in the eventual outcome.
Odinga started off well, leading in the first two rounds. However, as the voting progressed, his numbers stagnated while Youssouf gained momentum, securing victory in the seventh round with 33 votes—exactly the two-thirds majority required. Meanwhile, the election of four Anglophone commissioners shifted the balance, reinforcing the power of linguistic blocs, a decisive factor in Odinga’s defeat.
Kenya approached this election with a sense of entitlement, mirroring England’s infamous overconfidence during major football tournaments. The assumption that Odinga’s candidacy was inevitable ignored the political, regional, and linguistic forces at play.
Diplomatic gaffes only made matters worse. A few hours before the vote, Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary, Dr. Korir Sing’oei, issued statements attacking the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Madagascar. This alienated potential allies at a crucial moment. SADC, which commands 16 votes, had not explicitly endorsed any candidate but coalesced behind Madagascar’s Richard Randriamandrato in the early rounds. Once Randriamandrato was eliminated, SADC’s votes shifted towards Youssouf rather than Odinga, sealing the Kenyan candidate’s fate.
Another significant factor was President William Ruto’s handling of the DRC peace process. As chair of the East African Community (EAC), Ruto’s perceived favoritism towards Rwanda in the DRC conflict antagonized Kinshasa and by extension, SADC. When President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC snubbed Ruto’s EAC meeting in favor of a separate SADC summit, the writing was on the wall: Kenya had lost crucial backing.
This diplomatic fallout had a ripple effect. The DRC crisis created friction between the EAC and SADC, splitting what should have been a united East African front. Somalia, another EAC member, had also hinted at voting against Kenya in favor of Djibouti. Odinga’s loss was as much about Kenya’s diplomatic blunders as it was about his personal candidacy.
The Francophone bloc has long dominated the African Union’s leadership structures. While there were initially two Francophone candidates—Youssouf and Randriamandrato—the elimination of the latter meant that the Francophone vote consolidated behind Youssouf. This pattern is not new; past elections have consistently favored French-speaking candidates. Kenya, despite being one of Africa’s major Anglophone nations, underestimated the importance of linguistic alignment.
Kenya should have learned from its failed 2017 bid when Amina Mohamed lost the AU Chairperson election. Instead, history repeated itself. The idea that a Kenyan candidate could triumph without solid regional backing or a clear Francophone appeal proved once again to be flawed.
Moreover, Kenya’s foreign policy inconsistencies played a role. Its shifting stance on the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), its close ties with Morocco, and its initial support for Israel’s AU observer status alienated key voting blocs. These decisions, made with little consideration for their long-term diplomatic consequences, came back to haunt Odinga’s bid.
Kenya must now face an uncomfortable truth: it cannot impose itself on the continent without first mastering the art of alliance-building. The notion that merely fielding a high-profile candidate is enough to win ignores the complex reality of African diplomacy.
Raila Odinga’s concession speech was gracious, but the real lesson here is for Kenya’s political class. The country must recognize that overconfidence, poor regional engagement, and a failure to read the room cost them the AUC Chair position. If Kenya hopes to succeed in future bids, it must abandon its “it’s coming home” mentality and embrace the hard realities of African diplomacy.
Until then, the AUC Chairmanship remains elusive, a prize lost not just because of external pressures, but because Kenya failed to play the game right.